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Chapter 17  SDG 17: Partnerships for 
the Goals – Focus on Forest 
Finance and Partnerships
David Humphreys*, Benjamin Singer, Kathleen McGinley, Roy Smith, Jessica Budds, 
Mónica Gabay, Shonil Bhagwat, Wil de Jong, Helen Newing, Charlotte Cross  
and Poshendra Satyal
Key Points
 • Funding for forests from official development assistance and other 
sources has trended upward since 2000, providing reason for cautious 
optimism. However, finance for REDD+ is in decline.
 • Private-sector investment remains important. Impact investment, which 
aims to solve pressing environmental and social problems, could make a 
significant contribution to the sustainability agenda.
 • Not all sustainable development finance promotes forest conservation. 
SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) aims to increase funding for agricultural production, 
which can incentivise the conversion of forests to farmland.
 • The policy of zero net deforestation is leading to some important 
partnerships, including with the financial sector, that aim to ensure 
deforestation-free commodity supply chains of key agricultural 
commodities.
 • Partnerships for sustainable development exist within a neoliberal global 
economic order, in which net financial flows from the Global South to 
the Global North negate financial flows for sustainable development.
17.1 Introduction
Successful realisation of SDG 17 is vital for attaining the other SDGs, all of 
which depend on securing means of implementation and forging durable 
partnerships for sustainable development. It is one of the most comprehen-
sive goals as the means of implementation encompass finance, information 
and communication technology, capacity-building, international trade and 
data monitoring. SDG 17 contains a broad range of targets and indicators 
(see Table 17.1), some of which are analysed here. To examine the complex 
relationships between SDG 17 and forests, an extensive literature review and 
* Lead author.
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synthesis was undertaken to identify policy papers and analyses on forest-
related means of implementation and partnerships for sustainable devel-
opment. Websites of actors working in these areas were trawled and links 
followed to identify additional source material and ‘grey literature’.
This chapter explores ways to strengthen the means of implementation. 
Section 17.2 focuses in depth on financial assistance and partnerships. We do 
not focus on international trade, which is examined in Chapter 10. Section 
17.3 examines the distinction between sustainable and unsustainable forest 
Table 17.1 SDG 17 targets
Target 17.1:  Strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through 
international support to developing countries, to improve 
domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection
Target 17.2:  Developed countries to implement fully their official 
development assistance commitments, including the 
commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target 
of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for official development 
assistance (ODA/GNI) to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 
per cent of ODA/GNI to least-developed countries
Target 17.3:  Mobilise additional financial resources for developing countries 
from multiple sources
Target 17.4:  Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt 
sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering 
debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, 
and address the external debt of highly indebted poor countries 
to reduce debt distress
Target 17.5:  Adopt and implement investment promotion regimes for least-
developed countries
Target 17.6:  Enhance North–South, South–South and triangular regional and 
international cooperation on and access to science, technology 
and innovation, and enhance knowledge-sharing on mutually 
agreed terms
Target 17.7:  Promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion 
of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries 
on favourable terms
Target 17.8:  Fully operationalise the technology bank and science, technology 
and innovation capacity-building mechanism for least-developed 
countries by 2017 and enhance the use of enabling technology, 
in particular information and communications technology
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Table 17.1 (cont.)
Target 17.9:  Enhance international support for implementing effective and 
targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support 
national plans to implement all the Sustainable Development Goals
Target 17.10:  Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and 
equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade 
Organisation
Target 17.11:  Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, 
in particular with a view to doubling the least-developed 
countries’ share of global exports by 2020
Target 17.12:  Realise timely implementation of duty-free and quota-
free market access on a lasting basis for all least-developed 
countries, consistent with World Trade Organisation decisions
Target 17.13:  Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through 
policy coordination and policy coherence
Target 17.14: Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development
Target 17.15:  Respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish 
and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable 
development
Target 17.16:  Enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, 
complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilise and 
share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources
Target 17.17:  Encourage and promote effective public, public–private and 
civil society partnerships, building on the experience and 
resourcing strategies of partnerships
Target 17.18:  By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing 
countries to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, 
timely and reliable disaggregated data
Target 17.19:  By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop measurements 
of progress on sustainable development that complement gross 
domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in 
developing countries
Source: Adapted from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/SDG17
financing and their different impacts on forests. In particular, subsidies that 
incentivise the expansion of agricultural land can have a deleterious impact 
on forests. Section 17.4 addresses zero net deforestation (ZND), examining 
whether tensions exist among different SDGs. We argue that careful attention 
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should be paid to the agro-forestry interface, with sustainable agriculture a 
prerequisite for achieving ZND. Building on this, Section 17.5 looks at some 
of the more innovative partnership arrangements that promote sustainable 
forest-related development. Section 17.6 briefly examines the broader struc-
ture of global economic governance, and how this negates efforts to increase 
the means of implementation in developing countries. Section 17.7 presents 
the conclusions.
17.2 Strengthening the Means of Implementation 
through Increased Financing
Target 17.3 aims to ‘Mobilise additional financial resources for developing 
countries from multiple sources’. The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that achieving the SDGs will require 
investments in developed and developing countries of USD 5–7 trillion per 
year (UNCTAD 2014). For developing countries, the estimate is USD 3.3–4.5 
trillion. At today’s level of investment – public and private – an annual short-
fall of USD 2.5 trillion is estimated for developing countries. Hence, strength-
ening the means of implementation, including implementing the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development (endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly in 2015), is essential for achieving the SDGs. In terms of 
forests, SDG 17 promotes the need to increase financing levels for sustainable 
forest management (SFM) and to enhance cooperation among public, pri-
vate and non-governmental stakeholders. It has been estimated that halving 
deforestation rates in developing countries will cost USD 20 billion per year 
(Boucher 2008, Forest Trends 2017).
TWO COMPLEMENTARY TYPOLOGIES
In the absence of a universally recognised definition of SFM, quantify-
ing financing levels is a daunting challenge, further complicated by the 
lack of financial statistics available for sustainable investments in general 
(Holopainen and Wit 2008). Singer (2016) suggests two typologies of SFM 
financing. The first, based on sources, is inspired by the fivefold categorisation 
of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda: international public 
financing, domestic public financing, international private financing, domes-
tic private financing and – as a residual category – blended and innovative 
financing (Figure 17.1).
The second typology is based on the cross-sectoral nature of forests, in 
particular the distinction between forest financing and SFM financing. 
Forest financing refers to all financial sources that benefit the forest sec-
tor. Many of these sources, however, do not support sustainable forms of 
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Figure 17.1 SFM financing by type of flow. Source: UN 2014; see also Singer 2016.
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Figure 17.2 SFM financing as a cross-sectoral category. For simplicity, additional sectors which may 
impact upon SFM financing are not depicted; neither is financing in other sectors that do not impact 
upon SFM either positively or negatively. Source: Singer 2016.
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forest management: some forest sector investments – whether public, private, 
domestic or international – incentivise unsustainable management, such as 
overharvesting. SFM financing is a cross-sectoral category that overlaps par-
tially with forest financing. While SFM financing comes largely from the for-
est sector, there are also sources outside this sector (Figure 17.2).
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17.2.1 Trends in Increased Finance
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC FINANCING
In 2017 only five members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
met the UN’s target of providing official development assistance (ODA) equal 
to 0.7 per cent of gross national income, called for by Target  17.2. These 
countries were Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the UK, with 
two non-DAC countries also meeting the target: Turkey and the United 
Arab Emirates (OECD 2018a). One difficulty in understanding forest-related 
financing is a shortage of reliable data. Nevertheless, the limited information 
available paints a picture of cautious optimism. The most reliable data focus 
on international public financing (Figure 17.3). While the overall trend in 
recent years is upward, closer scrutiny of national figures reveals volatility 
over space and time (Singer 2016). While only a handful of countries receives 
most forestry ODA each year, which countries these are changes over time 
and thus forestry ODA per country may increase or decrease several-fold from 
one year to the next. However, 27 developing countries received no forestry 
ODA for the period 2002–2010 (AGF 2012, Singer 2016).
OECD figures depend on donor self-reporting, so ODA that affects forests 
but is not explicitly labelled forestry by donors does not appear. This is par-
ticularly relevant for contributions for Reducing Emissions for Deforestation 
and forest Degradation (REDD+), which many donors classify as climate 
finance. Complementary data on REDD+ financing for 2009 to 2014 by Forest 
Figure 17.3 Global ODA for forestry (gross disbursements) 2002–2016 in USD millions of constant 
2016 USD. Source: OECD 2018b.
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Trends show significant variability: USD 1.6 billion in 2009, but just USD 0.3 
billion in 2014 (Silva-Chávez et al. 2015).
ODA for the global forest sector, including assistance for forestry develop-
ment, education and research, generally increased, with annual fluctuations 
between 2000 and 2015, with a low of USD 400 million in the early 2000s and 
a high of USD 1.15 billion in 2011 (OECD 2017a, 2017b). An uptick in com-
mitments occurred in the early 2010s, associated with the fast-start climate 
finance promised by developed countries in the climate negotiations and 
increased funding commitments during the International Year of Forests in 
2011 (OECD 2017a). At the Paris climate summit in 2015, Germany, Norway 
and the UK collectively committed to provide more than USD 5 billion from 
2015 to 2020 to forest countries demonstrating verified emission reductions, 
with the summit agreeing on a collective goal of USD 100 billion by 2025 
(Nakhooda et al. 2016).
Commitments, however, do not always translate into dollars invested on 
the ground. Since 2011, REDD+ financing has slowly dwindled. The carbon 
bubble that led to speculation among private investors was short-lived. The 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), which helps developing coun-
tries implement REDD+ through financial and technical assistance, has 17 
financial contributors with total commitments of more than USD 1.1 billion 
(FCPF 2017). However, the FCPF, UN-REDD and other REDD+ funders have 
been criticised for promoting a narrow focus on just one forest public good, 
namely carbon sequestration, while neglecting others – what has been termed 
the ‘climatisation’ of the global forest regime (Singer and Giessen 2017). This 
reflects a tension between SDG  13 (Climate Action) and SDG  15 (Life on 
Land). By the end of 2016, 73 per cent of the 2008–2016 commitments had 
been deposited, of which just 36 per cent were approved for project disburse-
ment (CFU 2017). This gap between pledged and disbursed funds reflects the 
challenges in moving beyond capacity-building to implementation and the 
impact of the global financial crisis on public-sector finances (Watson et al. 
2016, Norman and Nakhooda 2014).
Verchot (2015) compared the popularity of REDD+ with Gartner’s Hype 
Cycle; it has gone from a ‘peak of inflated expectations’ into a ‘trough of 
disillusionment’. While the Paris Agreement (UN 2015, Article 5.2) is the first 
international agreement to recognise REDD+, subsequent funding pledges 
have been slow to materialise. In 2017 the Green Climate Fund launched a 
USD 500 million request for proposals on REDD+ implementation. The pledge 
by developed countries at COP15 in Copenhagen to mobilise USD 100 billion 
in climate finance by 2020, however, seems unlikely to be fulfilled (Roberts 
and Weikmans 2016). The likelihood of leveraging sufficient funding to meet 
REDD+ implementation requirements is uncertain.
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INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE FINANCING
A consistent REDD+ figure over the years has been the low proportion of 
private REDD+ finance – approximately 10 per cent (Silva-Chávez et al. 2015, 
UN Environment 2016) – confirming that the central role once envisaged for 
the private sector has failed to materialise, leaving public donors at the fore-
front of REDD+ financing. Data on SFM financing from private sources are 
scarce. The World Bank (2008) estimated annual private investment in the 
forestry sector in developing countries at nearly USD 15 billion – i.e. 40 times 
the forestry ODA disbursed that same year. Castrén et al. (2014) calculated 
private investment in forest plantations to be USD 1.8 billion per annum; no 
systematic data were found on private investments in tropical natural forests. 
Because these figures include investments along the broad spectrum of forest 
management, from unsustainable to sustainable, it is near impossible to place 
a figure on the proportion of these investments that would support SDG 17.
From 2009 to 2014 the private sector gave USD  35  million to support 
national REDD+ initiatives, with a further USD 381 million for carbon off-
set projects through the voluntary carbon market. During this period the 
private sector contributed approximately 10 per cent of REDD+ finance 
(Environmental Defense Fund and Forest Trends 2018). Government spend-
ing on REDD+ can help to leverage additional private-sector finance through 
public–private partnerships. An area of increasing importance, and one that 
can help meet Target 17.5, is impact investment – namely, an investment made 
with the specific intention to help solve the world’s most pressing environ-
mental and social problems while also generating financial returns for inves-
tors. According to the Business and Sustainable Development Commission 
(2017), achieving the SDGs could provide USD  12  trillion of investment 
opportunities and create 380 million new jobs by 2030. Examples of impact 
investment funds include the Mirova Land Degradation Neutrality Fund, 
launched in 2017, which aims to provide USD 300  million for SDG  15, 
including sustainable agriculture and forestry. The fund involves contribu-
tions from the private sector and government donors (Global Impact Investor 
Survey 2018). Institutional investors – now the main market participants in 
developing countries, with more than a thousand pension funds, founda-
tions, insurance companies and others (DANA 2011, Glauner et al. 2012) – 
show increasing interest in investing in SFM.
Forest Trends (2017) note a dramatic recent increase in conservation 
investments, intended to generate both a financial return and a measura-
ble environmental result. From an average of USD 0.2 billion for the period 
2004–2008, annual private investments increased tenfold by 2015 to USD 2 
billion. Of this, 80 per cent went to sustainable food and fibre, 18.5 per cent 
to habitat conservation and 2.5 per cent to water quality and quantity. These 
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figures indicate the growing interest of some private investors in sustainabil-
ity, mainly in the USA and to a lesser extent in Europe, although investments 
in emerging countries are increasing.
Despite this, most private finance in developing countries continues to be 
directed at developing forest plantations; Brazil is an example. Although they 
represent only 1.3 per cent of the country’s forests, plantations produce 78 per 
cent of Brazil’s sawlog and veneer (Tomaselli et al. 2012). Plantations do not 
necessarily provide high returns, although risk-adjusted returns are higher than 
for natural forests. The main reason for investing in plantations is that they 
are much more productive systems and contribute more quickly to closing the 
fibre gap. Tropical forests, particularly natural forests, continue to suffer from 
low levels of sustainable private investment due to macroeconomic instability, 
weak governance systems and a lack of enabling conditions, including:
 • Natural forest policies and legislation: Contradictory pressures from timber 
industries, public opinion and international organisations lead to 
incoherent policies and laws.
 • Land tenure: Lack of clear tenure adds to the risks posed by political and 
economic volatility, discouraging domestic and foreign investors.
 • Low risk-adjusted returns: While timber exploitation in tropical natural 
forests is a lucrative business, profits fall once SFM is applied because of 
the low productivity and relatively high management costs of tropical 
natural forests.
 • Reputation and information: The technical complexity of the timber sector 
combined with the continued (and incorrect) portrayal of the sector as 
the main cause of deforestation may discourage new investments.
The idea of using private capital to achieve forest-related SDGs is not with-
out controversy. Writing about the ‘corporate capture of biodiversity’, Lovera 
(2017) objects to the role of corporations. She argues that they offer financial 
support to the SDGs to conceal their attempts to undermine them, since safe-
guards and standards would limit profitability. However, as private-sector cor-
porations are publicly pressured to adopt, or altruistically seek, sustainability 
certification, they are likely to become an increasingly important partner in 
achieving forest-related SDGs. Furthermore, corporate–community partner-
ships can facilitate market access for commodities in ways that support com-
munity-driven forest development (Katila et al. 2017).
DOMESTIC FINANCING
Target 17.1 – strengthen domestic resource mobilisation – can be met through 
improved tax collection, tax incentives, subsidies and payments for environ-
mental services (PES). Whether domestic financing supports SFM depends in 
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large part on fair and effective implementation as well as other potentially 
countervailing policies. Domestic finance, whether public or private, is diffi-
cult to track because it varies widely among countries, with data compilation 
depending on the capacity and reliability of national statistics agencies. This 
may explain why, despite being identified as a critical source of financing for 
development (UN 2015), it continues to receive limited attention from ana-
lysts and decision makers. However, domestic private-sector financing is the 
most important source of forest-related investment in many Latin American 
countries, especially Brazil. In Africa, an important example is Cameroon 
(Box 17.1).
Many countries in the tropics, and elsewhere, have systems for allocat-
ing public timber resources, with harvest and/or area-based tax schemes 
intended to generate forest revenue for the state. However, these exhibit vary-
ing degrees of success in terms of rent capture and the equitable and effective 
distribution and use of funds, particularly in terms of activities that might be 
associated with the SDGs. Corruption and bribery often thwart potentially 
positive outcomes.
17.2.2 The Bigger Picture: Coherence and Coordination
This brief overview leads to an obvious conclusion: increasing levels of financ-
ing – whether public or private, domestic or international – is only half the 
battle. Effective coherence, as called for by Target 17.14, is key to ensuring 
that financing is allocated to optimise SDG implementation.
Public financing alone will not realise the SDGs. Private financing can 
help close the gap, but it is generally attracted to activities with high returns, 
Box 17.1 Domestic Forest Financing in Cameroon
In Cameroon, debates over forest revenue focus on domestic financing. 
Cameroon has a thriving timber industry, yet until the 1990s the state received 
minimal revenue as company profits were generally underdeclared and repat-
riated abroad (Eba’a Atyi et al. 2013). In 1994, the Forest Law introduced 
major changes, including an auction system for allocating timber concessions 
and a tax increase on timber production. Revenue increased fivefold before 
settling to an annual USD 52–63 million (Karsenty et al. 2006). Revenue dis-
tribution, however, has been more problematic. As stipulated in the 1994 law, 
half of the annual area fee goes to local municipalities and communities, yet 
poverty alleviation has been minimal due to financial mismanagement. The 
case highlights the vast potential of tax reforms to increase domestic financing, 
and the need for effective allocation of tax revenues to receive equal attention.
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declining once these returns fall below a certain threshold due to low produc-
tivity or high risk. Public financing could leverage additional private finance 
in two ways: (1) focus on forest-related areas of SFM with low returns, such 
as conservation and community forestry that can have a positive effect on 
forests and people; and (2) guarantee a minimum return for private invest-
ments to compensate for low returns or high risks. Public financing is also 
vital for: (1) creating the enabling conditions for sustainability (e.g. related to 
land and governance reform, jurisdictional planning processes and capacity-
building); (2) developing and piloting new approaches that, once established, 
may attract private investments; and (3) facilitating new partnerships.
One means of coordinating different sources of financing is national forest 
financing. The United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) has developed a four 
step strategy for SFM:
1. Mapping priorities and needs: Identify priorities in terms of goals, objectives 
and financing needs.
2. Mapping existing and potential sources of financing: Identify all existing 
sources and potential new financing sources, such as new taxes or payments 
for ecosystem services.
3. Matching priorities and needs with sources: Match objectives and activities 
with different financing sources according to criteria such as donor prefer-
ences, profitability and risk. Activities can be funded by more than one source.
4. Creating a roadmap for mobilising finance: Match each activity with one or 
more stakeholder(s) responsible for implementation. Budget for the financing 
needs quantified in Step 1 (Singer 2017).
Depending on the level of country ownership and donor support, national 
forest-finance strategies could form an effective tool in mobilising finance 
and implementing the SDGs. Where financing shortfalls are identified, there 
needs to be a mechanism for prioritising resource allocation.
17.3 Sustainable versus Unsustainable Financing
One cannot assess SFM financing without comparing it with financing for 
unsustainable forms of land management. The impacts of other land uses on 
forests are well documented, such as Myers’ (1981) hamburger connection. 
In recent years, researchers have started quantifying these cross-sectoral link-
ages. This is particularly important since it relates to the trade-offs among 
SDGs, explored in this chapter and elsewhere in this book. Lawson et  al. 
(2014) calculate that commercial agriculture caused more than two-thirds of 
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illegally cleared forests between 2010 and 2012, with Brazil and Indonesia 
accounting for 71 per cent of the global tropical forest area illegally con-
verted to commercial agriculture. Most tropical deforestation is driven by 
four forest-risk commodities, namely palm oil, soy, cattle and timber products 
(including paper). Persson et al. (2014) estimate that between 2000 and 2009 
these four commodities accounted for a third of tropical deforestation across 
eight countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Indonesia, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea).
If national governments and international organisations are to reduce 
forest loss, they clearly must counter the deforesting effects of producing 
these four forest-risk commodities. An Overseas Development Institute study 
reveals the difficulty of doing so (McFarland et al. 2015). With a focus on 
Brazil and Indonesia, which together lost 78  million ha of forest between 
1990 and 2010 (FAO 2010), the authors calculate that public subsidies to beef 
and soy in Brazil and to palm oil and timber in Indonesia totalled USD 47.242 
billion per year between 2009 and 2012. By comparison, in a period when 
REDD+ funding was at an all-time high, both countries received a combined 
USD 323 million a year for REDD+ and a mere USD 26 million a year in for-
estry ODA (McFarland et al. 2015). The study compares national-level agri-
cultural subsidies against international finance. It does not include national 
public-sector forest finance or consider the extent to which forest subsidies 
were included within agricultural subsidies.
Even so, and assuming that REDD+ financing and forestry ODA are addi-
tional, the main drivers of deforestation in both countries received as much 
as a staggering 136 times more domestic public funding than international 
public finance for forests over this period. Adding private investments to 
these highly lucrative agricultural commodities would further increase this 
figure. This is not to say that all cattle, soy, palm oil and timber production, 
and certainly not all related subsidies, generate deforestation (McFarland 
et al. 2015). Some agricultural subsidies also tackle social and environmen-
tal issues, including forest conservation and support for sustainability (e.g. 
through crop intensification and land-use change restrictions). Nevertheless, 
if even a fraction of the financial weight of subsidies for these commodi-
ties were to generate deforestation pressures, it would dwarf public interna-
tional financial support to SFM in both countries (Figure 17.4, Table 17.2 and 
Box 17.2).
This is especially relevant for two SDGs with both potential synergies and 
potential conflicts with forestry. First, SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) includes Target 
2.A, to ‘increase investment … to enhance agricultural productive capacity in 
developing countries, in particular in least developed countries’. The above-
mentioned subsidies could lead to forest loss, although this is less a problem 
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Table 17.2 Comparing REDD+ finance received with domestic expenditure 
on biofuel and agriculture subsidies (average annual USD million)
REDD+ Finance Agricultural Subsidies Biofuel Subsidies
(2006–2014  
Annual Average)
(2010–2012  
Annual Average)
(2009)
Brazil 158 11 082 2 700
Chile 0 709 n/a
China 9 160 023 500
Indonesia 165 27 072 79
Mexico 12 7 880 n/a
Total 344 206 766 3 279
Sources: REDD+ finance (Norman and Nahkooda 2014), Agricultural subsidies (OECD 2014a), 
Biofuel subsidies (Gerasimchuk et al. 2012).
Figure 17.4 Annual subsidies to agricultural commodities (beef and soy in Brazil; palm oil and 
timber in Indonesia) compared to annual international REDD+ finance and forestry ODA in Brazil and 
Indonesia, 2009–2012 (USD million). Sources: McFarland et al. 2015, OECD 2017b.
of unsustainable forest management and more one of unsustainable land use, 
illustrating that progress to achieve policy coherence for sustainable develop-
ment as called for by Target 17.14 has been limited.
Second, SDG 7 aims to ‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable 
and modern energy for all’ (without defining sustainable). While it does not 
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explicitly mention them, biofuels are often considered sustainable since 
the carbon emitted by their combustion is theoretically sequestered when 
crops consumed are replaced by new crop growth for future consumption. 
In this respect, biofuels can help achieve SDG  7 on affordable and green 
energy since they theoretically provide additional energy to meet growing 
demand while aiding climate-change mitigation. However, their large-scale 
adoption – e.g. in Brazil (sugarcane) and Indonesia (palm oil) – could have a 
Box 17.2 Forest Financing in Latin America
Many Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries are active in REDD+. 
Twenty-one LAC countries accounted for 56 per cent (USD 819 million) of 
the total funds approved for REDD+ project implementation globally between 
2008 and 2016 (USD 1.45 billion) (Watson et al. 2016, CFU 2017). Brazil 
alone accounted for 45 per cent of REDD+ funding approved for implemen-
tation during this period (69 per cent of the LAC total), followed by Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru and Chile (CFU 2017). Brazil’s Amazon Fund has received and 
disbursed the largest share of REDD+ financing (Amazon Fund 2017). By the 
end of 2016, it had received USD 1.747 billion in pledged funding, including 
more than USD 1 billion from Norway through a performance-based agree-
ment to slow forest loss and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from defor-
estation. By the end of 2016, USD 1.037 billion of total pledged funds had 
been deposited to the fund, of which USD 576 million had been disbursed to 
projects (CFU 2017). Amazon Fund policies to reduce forest loss and enhance 
forest sustainability are credited with measurable improvements in the forest 
sector, with deforestation declining from 27 772 km2 in 2004 to 4403 km2 in 
2012, but are associated with significant declines in agricultural commodity 
prices in the mid-to-late 2000s (Arima et al. 2014, Fearnside 2017, Nepstad 
et al. 2014). Deforestation rates in Brazil have increased above the lows of the 
early 2010s as more forests are converted to agriculture, in part due to agricul-
ture and biofuel subsidies that outpace climate financing for forests (Fearnside 
2017, Kissinger 2015). While current deforestation rates in Brazil remain below 
those of the early 2000s, they underscore the complexity of the trade-offs 
among SDGs across the tropics. For example, Kissinger (2015) found agricul-
ture and biofuel subsidies to be 600 and 9 times greater, respectively, than 
REDD+ financing in 5 major REDD+ countries (Table 17.2). Moreover, a review 
of more than 40 countries found that REDD+ readiness projects rarely include 
specific actions to address intersectoral conflicts relating to two or more SDGs, 
or to eliminate subsidies incentivising forest loss (Salvini et al. 2014).
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significant impact on forest cover and on forest peoples in tropical countries 
(Acheampong et al. 2017).
This section has assembled a body of evidence from several sources that 
leads to some important conclusions for achieving SDG 17. In particular, the 
financial incentives for the conversion of forests to alternative land uses such 
as agriculture are a fraction of those available for forest conservation and sus-
tainable management through public and private international and domestic 
financing. The relationship between SFM and agricultural production is rel-
evant to policies for ZND, to which attention now turns.
17.4 Zero Net Deforestation Commitments
While agriculture may contribute to rural economic development, food secu-
rity and other SDGs, forests conversion into agricultural land remains the 
leading cause of deforestation in many countries. To counter this, a growing 
number of companies and governments have committed to eliminate defor-
estation from production processes and supply chains through ZND over the 
last decade. ZND seeks to secure production of agricultural commodities with-
out deforesting primary forests, although deforestation that is compensated 
by afforestation planting elsewhere may be acceptable. Through examining 
ZND, this section considers the role that the agricultural and financial sectors 
can play in promoting SDG 17.
ZND emerged in 2008 during the Bonn Conference of Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity when the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
led a campaign supported by 67 countries calling for ZND by 2020 (WWF 
2009). WWF’s commitment to ZND is significant, as the organisation has a 
history of forging innovative partnerships to promote ambitious targets and 
international rules that other actors later adopt. The WWF was one of the pol-
icy leaders behind the creation of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), with 
the World Bank later adopting operational policies that drew directly from 
FSC principles (Humphreys 2006). ZND commitments require companies to 
identify the sources of their commodities and make supply chains traceable 
and transparent.
Global Forest Watch Commodities supports efforts to monitor forest activ-
ity in commodity supply chains (WRI 2017b). The Consumer Goods Forum, 
with some 400 member companies, has also backed ZND. The Tropical Forest 
Alliance 2020, launched in 2012 at Rio+20 as a global public–private partner-
ship to reduce tropical deforestation, reduce greenhouse emissions, improve 
smallholder livelihoods and conserve natural habitats, has also pledged sup-
port for ZND. The New York Declaration on Forests of 2015 includes commit-
ments from several governments and companies to remove deforestation from 
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commodity supply chains. The idea of ZND commodity chains has grown in 
popularity among donors. In 2015 the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
announced a USD  500  million programme to remove deforestation from 
commodity supply chains (GEF 2015). In 2017, Norway created a USD 400 
million fund to support this initiative, aiming to raise more than USD 1.6 bil-
lion in deforestation-free agricultural investments (GEF 2017).
While ZND commitments from the private sector have transformative 
potential, many companies publicly committed to ZND are failing to demand 
that their suppliers adopt a ZND policy. Many businesses with deforestation-
related commitments lack time-bound, actionable plans, and the majority do 
not publicly report on compliance with their own policies, making independ-
ent verification of progress difficult (Climate Focus 2016). Some business tar-
gets are aspirational only. Donofrio et al. (2017) analyse 760 commitments by 
447 companies to reduce deforestation in palm oil, soy, cattle, timber and pulp 
supply chains. Difficulties in measuring and meeting stated goals, including 
lack of corporate transparency (e.g. withholding information), led to about a 
quarter of commitments being either dormant or delayed. Furthermore, the 
voluntary self-regulatory nature of many commitments means that imple-
mentation gaps may emerge (Jopke and Schoneveld 2018).
On a global scale about 27 per cent of deforestation is caused by perma-
nent land-use change for commodity production (Curtis et al. 2018). In Latin 
America some two-thirds of deforestation is driven by commercial agriculture 
(Kissinger et al. 2012). In particular, production of the four forest-risk com-
modities (Section 17.3) has caused extensive tropical deforestation and is the 
source of widespread conflict between agriculture companies and local people 
(Abram et al. 2017).
Achieving ZND requires an agriculture sector based on deforestation-free 
commodity chains, particularly for the forest-risk commodities. Approximately 
40 per cent of global demand for the four risk commodities is accounted for 
by emerging producer-consumers (Brazil and Indonesia) and emerging major 
importers (China and India) (TFA 2018b). Effective SFM thus requires the 
active support of the governments of these four countries and their leading 
agricultural corporations. Without robust and verifiable, sustainable sourcing 
of these risk commodities, future expansion in their international trade will 
generate further deforestation pressures. This is particularly pressing given 
the emphasis in Target 17.11 to significantly increase the developing coun-
tries’ exports, which would enable developing countries to increase hard cur-
rency earnings. Expanding the production of agricultural commodities could 
contribute towards SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) but would conflict with SDG 15 (Life 
on Land). It seems clear that ZND targets cannot be achieved unless inte-
grated action is taken at the agriculture-forestry interface.
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Global Canopy selected 250 companies, 150 financial institutions and 
other actors (the ‘Forest 500’) that are at risk of being linked to tropical defor-
estation through potential exposure to forest-risk commodity chains and that 
have the greatest influence within the political economy of tropical defor-
estation. Their report on the Forest 500 shows that progress towards ZND has 
been limited. For example, although cattle production is the most important 
forest-risk commodity, only 17 per cent of cattle companies surveyed have 
a policy for forest protection, while just 8 of the 150 financial institutions 
surveyed have a policy for all four forest-risk commodities (Rogerson 2017). 
A UN Environment Programme (UNEP) report found that none of the com-
panies it surveyed have a process to quantify the risks associated with invest-
ment portfolios in forest-related agricultural commodities (UNEP 2015). The 
importance of the forestry–agriculture interface suggests that the transition 
to ZND requires a dramatic shift in investments from the drivers of deforesta-
tion towards sustainable agriculture and forestry (Climate Focus 2017).
While banks and other financial institutions that lend to or invest in 
companies engaged in harvesting and trading in forest-risk commodities are 
themselves exposed to the financial and reputational risks of deforestation, 
only a limited number have made progress in integrating these risks into their 
management structures. The important role of investment suggests a crucial 
role for banks and investment companies. Uptake of certification – forest cer-
tification such as the FSC and agricultural products such as the Roundtable 
on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) – is low in many tropical areas. However, 
financial institutions may foster further uptake by insisting that client com-
panies be members of certification schemes or that the schemes be used to 
set minimum standards for loans (TFA 2018a). Financial institutions need 
to look beyond reputational risks and better understand how funding forest 
commodities can expose them to financial risks, especially given the growing 
interest of many institutional investors in impact investment (TFA 2018a). 
Options include introducing new financial products linked to ZND, such as 
green bonds and sustainable landscape bonds.
Banking-sector engagement in forest issues includes the Banking 
Environment Initiative (BEI), a University of Cambridge initiative of 12 
leading banks that seeks to direct investment capital towards ZND busi-
ness models. The BEI has partnered with the Consumer Goods Forum on 
the Soft Commodities Compact, which promotes partnerships between agri-
cultural businesses and the financial sector to transform commodity supply 
chains of the forest-risk commodities to achieve ZND (Cambridge Institute 
for Sustainability Leadership 2018). Another important initiative is the 
Principles for Responsible Investment, which includes an Investor Initiative 
for Responsible Forests focused mainly on cattle supply chains (PRI 2018).
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These examples suggest the need to broaden sustainable development part-
nerships to involve new actors, including banks and investment companies, 
regional and national governments, and national and international non-gov-
ernmental organisations (NGOs). The active promotion of deforestation-free 
commodity chains by the financial sector would mean that companies con-
tinuing to trade in products produced by deforestation would find it difficult 
to raise capital. Governmental involvement may be necessary to offset finan-
cial incentives discouraging the sustainable sourcing of agricultural products. 
In China, for example, soybean producers wishing to adopt RSPO standards 
may face a cost increase of USD 3–4 per metric tonne, a significant cost in a 
country where profit margins are thin (TFA 2018b). Government underwrit-
ing of sustainability standards (e.g. subsidies) may help overcome such mar-
ket barriers.
The financial sector can thus play an important role in incentivising defor-
estation-free commodity chains. Noting that the most important indirect 
causes of deforestation are found in global financial and commodity markets, 
the World Resources Institute (WRI) proposes that more effective use be made 
of financial data and corporate governance to hold corporations accountable 
for how well they implement their supply chain commitments, including 
ZND and elimination of illegal deforestation. This requires greater corporate 
transparency, including providing access to relevant data (Graham et al. 2018). 
Financial markets fail to distinguish between commodities produced accord-
ing to ZND principles and those generating a deforestation footprint. There 
are no ‘deforestation free’ commodities listed on the world’s financial mar-
kets, limiting both the incentives for companies to produce such commodities 
and gain a price premium from them and the opportunities for responsible 
investors to reward companies committed to ZND (Graham et al 2018). Many 
companies will find it disadvantageous to market deforestation-free products 
when doing so increases their costs and erodes their competitive advantage 
relative to more unscrupulous businesses. The two Amsterdam Declarations 
of 2015 – on deforestation and sustainable palm oil – aim to address this prob-
lem by generating demand for sustainable commodities and supporting the 
implementation of private-sector commitments to  deforestation-free com-
modity supply chains (Partnership for Forests 2017, 2018).
One mechanism that could enable agricultural businesses to internalise 
the financial risks of producing deforestation-free products is a new global 
data platform on corporate data and forest risks. This could be structured 
around the Accountability Framework, which provides a set of definitions 
and core principles for establishing, implementing and monitoring ethi-
cal supply chain commitments (Accountability Framework 2018). Such a 
database would document the financial risks of investing in commodities 
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produced through deforestation. It could also document the procedures that 
key financial institutions expect from client businesses involved in trading 
forest-risk commodities and could collate company data on the performance 
of investors in financing deforestation-free commodity chains. This would 
be consistent with Target 17.8 to enhance the use of enabling technologies, 
including information technology for sustainable development.
The High Carbon Stock Approach (HCSA) is a multi-stakeholder initiative 
designed to standardise the implementation of commitments to ZND in palm 
oil, pulp and paper. Its members include eight of the world’s largest palm oil, 
pulp and paper companies, together with consumer goods manufacturers, 
environmental and human rights organisations, and technical organisations, 
including the Union of Concerned Scientists. The HCSA offers a standard 
approach for fulfilling ZND commitments, including a field methodology 
for identifying forests with a high carbon stock (HCS forests) that must be 
conserved. HCSA also has protocols related to the rights and livelihoods of 
Indigenous peoples and local communities, including the need for free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC). The commitments enshrined in the HCSA are 
impressive but raise issues concerning the interplay between environmental 
protection and community rights. For example: What should happen when 
communities want plantation development but the HCSA requirements 
make it unacceptable? How can conservation of HCSA forests on community 
lands be reconciled with the right to FPIC? Should there be restrictions on 
local people’s access to and use of HCS forests? If so, what incentives and 
benefits are there for communities to collaborate in conservation (Colchester 
et al. 2016)? It is not yet clear whether a system of this kind can provide a 
significant level of accountability, but in the absence of legislation, the HCSA 
has the potential to advance norms on acceptable social and environmental 
practice. The case of ZND makes it clear that innovative partnerships for sus-
tainable development can both generate innovative sources of finance and 
promote integrated sustainability strategies between the forest sector and 
other sectors.
17.5 Partnerships for Sustainable Development
Targets 17.16 and 17.17 stress the importance of partnerships and the contri-
butions they can make to sustainable development. Advantages of sustainable 
development partnerships include managing complexity (Visseren-Hamakers 
2013); filling governance gaps where governments are unable or unwilling to 
act (Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2011, Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2006, 
Von Moltke 2002); addressing deficits in regulation, participation and imple-
mentation (Biermann et al. 2007); and regularising interactions, including 
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placing previously informal interactions on a more formal, perhaps legal, 
footing (Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2012).
There is nothing inherently sustainable about partnerships. Partnerships 
are discursive battlefields that reflect power imbalances among actors grap-
pling with different values and principles (Arévalo and Ros-Tonen 2009). 
Some partnerships may promote sustainable practices, others may not. For 
Andonova and Levy (2003), the popularity of partnerships as a form of gov-
ernance originates from the disengagement from sustainable development of 
public authorities who have ‘franchised’ environmental governance to other 
actors. The UNFF initiative on financing (Paramaribo Initiative) argues that 
because stakeholders have different levels of power, governments must estab-
lish the rules governing partnerships to ensure that the interests of weaker 
stakeholders, such as Indigenous communities and small enterprises, are 
equitably represented (Paramaribo Initiative 2008). Partnerships that include 
local communities are essential for achieving the SDGs (SDIA 2013, 2015, 
CCAFS 2017).
As discussed, a number of forest-related partnerships help achieve the SDG 
targets on strengthening the means of implementation, such as the FCPF, 
UN-REDD (Section 17.2) and the Partnerships for Forests, which supports 
a range of national-level forest partnerships with investment models, for 
example, on sustainable palm oil development as part of ZND commitments 
(Section 17.4). This section considers some of the further roles partnerships 
can play to promote the SDGs, examining three global partnerships, three 
regional partnerships and one public-private partnership.
17.5.1 Global Partnerships
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Sectoral Policies Department 
(SECTOR) promotes the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda to advance Target  8.8 
on protecting labour rights and promoting safe and secure working envi-
ronments.1 The ILO’s promotion of decent work in forestry includes inter-
ventions to support the transition from the informal economy (e.g. illegal 
logging) to the formal economy, promoting employment creation, enhanc-
ing training and skills development and improving working conditions (ILO 
2017). Together with FAO and the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE), the ILO formed the Joint Experts Network on Green 
Jobs in Forestry, which fosters international cooperation on the technical, 
economic and organisational aspects of forest management, working tech-
niques and training forest workers. The network contributes to the integrated 
1 Information in this paragraph from Sabine de Bruijn, ILO Secretariat, email, 7 June 2017.
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work programme of the Committee on Forests and the Forest Industry 
and the European Forestry Commission, in particular for green jobs in the 
forest sector and the social and cultural aspects of SFM (ILO 2018). Other 
organisations engaged in partnerships on forest workers’ rights and, more 
broadly, the rights of Indigenous peoples and forest communities include the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), especially through 
its Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy; the Forest 
Peoples Programme; the Centre for People and Forests; and the International 
Model Forest Network.
The Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) is an interagency partnership 
among 14 international organisations (including IUFRO, CIFOR, ICRAF, 
GEF, FAO and IUCN). Among the SDG targets that the CPF contributes to 
are Target 17.6, on enhancing access to science, technology, innovation and 
knowledge sharing, and Target 17.8, on operationalising capacity-building 
mechanisms in science, technology and innovation. The CPF aims to stream-
line and align the work of member organisations and find ways to improve 
forest management (including conservation, production and trade of forest 
products). One of the most important initiatives of CPF member organisa-
tions, especially IUFRO, is the Global Forest Expert Panels, which serve as 
an international boundary mechanism that mediates the transfer of state-
of-the-art knowledge across the science–policy interface. The knowledge 
these panels generate is disseminated at international forest policy bodies 
such as the World Forestry Congress and the UNFF and is widely accepted 
by the forest policy community as authoritative (Humphreys 2009).
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development has a Forest 
Solutions Group (FSG) that aims to provide a global platform for collabora-
tion across value chains for forest products. The FSG’s emphasis on expand-
ing markets for responsible forest products and sustainability performance 
(WBCSD 2018) contributes to SDG 12 on responsible production and con-
sumption. Businesses signing up with the FSG agree to adhere to a set of 
membership responsibilities on sustainable development that are measured 
by key performance indicators, including resource efficiency and climate 
and water stewardship.
17.5.2 Regional Partnerships
Initiative 20x20 is the first regional commitment to at-scale forest and land-
scape restoration in Latin America. Participants include the WRI, International 
Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), Tropical Agricultural Research and 
Higher Education Center (CATIE), IUCN and Natural Capital Project, organi-
sations in national and regional governments and the private sector (WRI 
2017a). Its work promotes Target 15.2 on ending deforestation and restoring 
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degraded forests. The initiative has secured commitments from 11 countries, 
3 states and 4 NGOs to restore 27.7 million ha of land by 2020, and has 
secured private investments of USD 1.15 billion (WRI 2017a). These commit-
ments directly contribute to the SDGs and can generate co-benefits for people, 
economy and ecosystems. However, challenges exist in turning commitments 
into measurable restoration, particularly where there are limitations in insti-
tutional capacities, financial architectures and local participation. Efforts that 
rely on planting trees to achieve restoration goals are unlikely to result in vast 
expanses of reforested areas given the costs, time required, low survival rates 
of planted trees and forestry departments with limited resources (Reij and 
Winterbottom 2017).
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a partnership established 
in 1989 between 21 Pacific Rim economies. Among the forest-related SDGs 
to which APEC contributes is SDG 15.2 on increasing forest cover. In 2007 
APEC adopted the 2020 Forest Cover Goal to restore 20 million ha of forests. 
The Sydney APEC Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security 
and Clean Development includes the commitment ‘to achieve an APEC-wide 
aspirational goal of increasing forest cover in the region by at least 20 million 
ha of all types of forests by 2020’ (APFNet 2015). If achieved, this would store 
approximately 1.4 billion tonnes of carbon – about 11 per cent of annual 
global emissions. However, the goal, endorsed by all 21 APEC members, is 
voluntary, with no enforcement mechanisms to assure compliance. Since its 
adoption, planted forests have increased by slightly more than 20 million 
ha across APEC countries. However, the net increase of forest cover was only 
15.4 million ha due to a 7.9 million ha decrease in forest cover in Indonesia, 
Peru and Australia (APFNet 2015).
The SAMOA Pathway is an initiative of small island developing states 
(SIDS). SAMOA stands for SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action, a pathway 
approach to sustainable development with several priority areas pertaining to 
forest-related SDGs (SIDS 2014). The main sustainable development concern 
of the SAMOA Pathway is to build resilience to counter sea-level rise related 
to climate change (consistent with Target 13.1), a key priority for all low-lying 
atoll states. For the larger SIDS, such as Papua New Guinea and the Solomon 
Islands, forests provide a revenue stream as well as non-economic benefits 
such as tourism. Regional organisations such as the Caribbean Community 
and the Pacific Islands Forum play an important role in information shar-
ing and coordination. In December 2015, the General Assembly established 
the SIDS Partnership Framework, in accordance with the SAMOA Pathway, to 
monitor and ensure the implementation of pledges through partnerships for 
SIDS.
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17.5.3 Public–Private Partnerships
The Global Partnership on Forest and Landscape Restoration (GPFLR) is an inter-
national network that brings together governments, research institutes, com-
munities and individuals. Launched in 2003 by the IUCN, the WWF and the 
UK’s Forestry Commission, the partnership of 25 governments and NGOs 
aims to restore 350 million ha of deforested and degraded land by 2030 
(GPFLR 2017). It aims to respond to the Bonn Challenge (consistent with 
Target  15.2) on restoring deforested land and degraded forests by promot-
ing forest and landscape restoration (FLR), defined as ‘a process that aims to 
regain ecological functionality and enhance human well-being in deforested 
or degraded landscapes’ (Besseau et al. 2018). The focus of FLR is landscapes 
(rather than individual forest sites), with FLR taking place both within and 
across landscapes in order to create interacting land uses and management 
systems.
This brief survey makes clear some of the roles partnerships can play. In 
addition to raising and disbursing finance, roles include generating and dis-
seminating scientific knowledge, pooling expertise, promoting innovative 
solutions (such as FLR), protecting workers’ rights and promoting sustain-
ability practices among forest-related businesses in support of the SDGs. 
Local umbrella organisations play an essential role in forging partnerships for 
sustainable development. Local concerns can be channelled into global pro-
cesses by organisations representing local groups and communities. Examples 
from Latin America include the Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations 
of the Amazon River Basin and the Mesoamerican Alliance of People and 
Forests (AMPB). These organisations help ensure that delivery of the SDGs 
and related commitments is respectful of Indigenous peoples and local com-
munities. For instance, AMPB organised local consultations through mem-
bers to identify advocacy priorities in climate-change negotiations to inform 
their ‘If Not Us, Then Who?’ campaign, which called for the recognition of 
resource rights and FPIC. Community–company partnerships for timber and 
non-timber forest products, including partnerships for PES, can provide com-
munities with income and other benefits. Although PES is often presented 
as a win–win scenario that raises additional finance for sustainable develop-
ment, contributes to conservation goals and enables land-based poor groups 
to benefit from additional income (Duncan 2006, Pagiola et al. 2005, Wunder 
2008), care must be taken to ensure respect for the rights and ancestral life-
styles of Indigenous peoples.
Different partnerships can generate different outcomes. Foreign direct 
investment from a multinational logging company will bring short-term gain 
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to an indebted economy that relies on export earnings. Yet the communi-
ties most impacted by logging often see little of the market value of timber 
production while bearing the socio-economic and environmental costs. This 
underlines an inherent tension in the dynamics of partnerships: relationships 
tend to be asymmetrical, with a clear hierarchy of power and influence. In 
the context of the tropical timber trade such relationships operate between 
local landowners and national governments, which, in turn, are connected 
to the power dynamics between the more developed ‘core’ economies and 
those that trade with them. This dynamic is overlaid, and often reinforced, 
by the private sector, with many multinational corporations aiming to max-
imise profit extraction while social and environmental costs are often borne 
by local communities. We now turn to the question of asymmetrical power 
relationships in the global economy.
17.6 The Broader Structure of Economic 
Governance
If it is to be comprehensive, the discussion in this chapter on strengthen-
ing the means of implementation and revitalising partnerships for sustain-
able development cannot focus solely on forests and forest-related sectors. 
With Target 17.13 stressing the need to enhance macroeconomic stability, 
including policy coordination and coherence, and Target 17.14 emphasising 
the importance of policy coherence for sustainable development, the broader 
political and economic context within which efforts to promote sustainable 
development occur must be considered.
Here an international political economy framework is helpful. For interna-
tional political economists, understanding global power structures requires 
comprehension of both politics and economics. Those who wield economic 
power, such as business executives and financial elites, must take into account 
political factors, such as government policy, while the exercise of political 
power is shaped to a large degree by the economic context. Hence, there is 
a complex and iterative relationship between political and economic power.
Contrary to what SDG 17 aims to promote – a global partnership for sus-
tainable development – a political economy view argues that in as much 
as a global partnership may be said to exist, it is one founded on neolib-
eral principles, such as the expansion of international trade and economic 
growth, with relatively limited attention to environmental conservation. In 
this view, the triumvirate of international economic and financial institu-
tions – the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Trade Organisation – provide a neoliberal normative framework that favours 
the interests of transnational corporations and powerful states, primarily 
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from the Global North (Humphreys 2006). This framework promotes the lib-
eralisation of goods and services and the restructuring of economies in the 
Global South to enforce the repayment of debts. This can be seen as a neolib-
eral business-based constitutionalism in which corporate rights and capitalist 
expansion dominate at the expense of the environment and human welfare 
(Gill 2002, Derber 2002).
According to this view, the pursuit of sustainable development cannot suc-
ceed because the normal and routine functioning of the global economy gen-
erate unsustainability, negating any gains that may be realised through the 
promotion of the SDGs. For example, in 2012 (the most recent year with reli-
able data) developing countries received about USD 2 trillion in ODA, foreign 
investment and trade. However, for this same year, some USD 5 trillion flowed 
from developing countries to the Global North in the form of debt repay-
ments, capital flight, repatriation of profits, payment of intellectual property 
rights and illicit outflows (Hickel 2017). In other words, the poorer countries 
of the global economy made a net transfer of approximately USD 3 trillion 
to the richer countries. According to another estimate, in 2012 the govern-
ments of developing countries repaid USD 182 billion to their creditors but 
received only USD 133 billion in ODA. Remittances from emigrants grossed 
an estimated USD 350 million, while multinational corporations made about 
USD 678 billion in profits, most of which was repatriated to their headquar-
ters in developed countries (Gottiniaux et al. 2015). According to Global 
Financial Integrity (GFI), the cumulative total of net South-to-North financial 
transfers since 1980 is USD 26.5 trillion (GFI 2015, Hickel 2017). These figures 
illustrate the exacerbation of a problem that SDG 10 seeks to address: reduc-
ing income inequalities between countries.
Debt servicing ratios as a percentage of exports of goods and services are 
once again trending upward, indicating extra pressure on forests and other 
natural-resource sectors to increase exports to earn hard currency to service 
external debts. From 2000 to 2011, debt service fell from 12.9 per cent to 
3.6 per cent in lower-middle-income countries before increasing to 6.1 per 
cent in 2015 (UN 2017, UN 2016), a trend that runs counter to Target 17.4 
to assist developing countries attain long-term debt sustainability. Although 
African countries annually receive USD 161.6 billion inflow through loans, 
remittances and aid, they incur net losses of about USD 203 billion through 
trade misinvoicing, debt payments and resource extraction (Curtis and Jones 
2017). Donoso Game (2018) estimates that between 1990 and 2004 Latin 
America paid USD 1.9 trillion in debt services (i.e. about USD 126.9 billion 
per year).
Llistar Bosch (2009) coins the term transnational interference to denote 
interventions from outside a country that directly or indirectly affect the 
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internal dynamics of a social group, community or country. These inter-
ferences take the form of normative transmissions through transnational 
mechanisms, such as loan agreements and sovereign debt-repayment 
schemes that impose conditions on developing countries. Not all transna-
tional interferences are negative. International cooperation that promotes 
SFM or that addresses illegal logging are examples of positive transnational 
interference. For Llistar Bosch (2009), however, most transnational interfer-
ence is negative: economic support to developing countries is influenced by 
geopolitical realities that correspond more to donor interests than those of 
the beneficiaries.
As well as focusing on legal flows of finance and natural resources, it is 
also necessary to examine those that take place illegally. It is estimated that, 
since 1980, illicit outflows account for 82 per cent of South-to-North net 
resource transfers (GFI 2015). Hickel contrasts the GFI estimates with more 
cautious OECD ones: ‘there is general consensus that illicit financial flows 
likely exceed aid flows and investment in volume’ (OECD 2014b: 15, cited 
in Hickel 2017: 334). These illicit financial flows include criminal activities 
in the logging sector, resulting in revenue losses that could be reinvested in 
forests. The World Bank has estimated that as much as 10 per cent of the 
value of the global timber trade is from illegal sources (World Bank 2006), 
with the figure for some countries as high as 90 per cent (Pereira Goncalves 
et al. 2012). The World Bank has also estimated that the global loss of revenue 
from illegal logging is at least USD  10  billion annually, about eight times 
greater than the total ODA flows to forests (World Bank 2013) and possibly 
as high as USD 15 billion (Pereira Goncalves et al. 2012). According to GFI, 
USD 1.09 trillion flowed illegally from developing countries in 2013, com-
pared to USD 465.3 billion in 2004 (Kar and Spanjers 2015). Research from 
UNCTAD reveals that the widespread illicit practice of trade misinvoicing – 
the practice of deliberately misreporting the value of imports or exports on 
invoices to enable capital flight, usually to an offshore account – is weakening 
the capacity of developing countries to implement sustainable development. 
This problem is widespread in primary commodity sectors in many develop-
ing countries (UNCTAD 2016). Between 1980 and 2012, developing countries 
lost USD 13.4 trillion through leakages in the balance of payments and trade 
misinvoicing (Centre for Applied Research 2015). Trade misinvoicing is an 
important route for capital flight from timber industries in many countries, 
including Cameroon (Mpenya et al. 2016). Countering illegal logging and 
other forest-related crimes relates to Target 16.4 to ‘significantly reduce illicit 
financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets 
and combat all forms of organised crime’. However, progress towards achiev-
ing this target is mixed.
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17.7 Conclusions
The evidence assembled in this chapter provides reason for cautious optimism 
on SDG 17. Significant progress has been made in generating additional fund-
ing for implementing forest-related sustainable development, with funding 
for forests from ODA and other sources trending upward. However, while a 
focus on increasing SDG implementation may lead to some tangible gains 
for forests, it may simultaneously reinforce some potential contradictions 
among SDGs. For example, much forest finance, in particular REDD+, has 
been targeted at the carbon sink function of forests. While this helps to attain 
SDG 13 (Climate Action), without strong safeguards for other forest goods 
and services it may run counter to realising SDG 15 (Life on Land). A further 
example includes the relationship between agriculture and forests. In several 
countries, international forest-related ODA is dwarfed by domestic subsidies 
for agricultural production. This provides a structural incentive for the con-
version of forests to agricultural land, in particular for the four forest-risk 
commodities. Both these examples suggest that realising forest-related sus-
tainable development depends on policy coherence between the forest sec-
tor and forest-related SDGs, as well as addressing the complex conflicts and 
synergies between them. While strengthening the means of implementation 
is to be welcomed, it should not be seen as a panacea. It can only lead to SFM 
when the intersectoral causes and consequences are fully understood, so that 
the broad range of public and private goods forests provide are conserved.
The case of ZND illustrates the importance of the duality of SDG 17, which 
promotes strengthening the means of implementation and revitalising part-
nerships for sustainable development. New partnerships can help generate 
additional finance, yet if finance is to be spent in ways that enhance SFM, 
then cross-sectoral partnerships extending beyond forests and promoting 
integrated strategies are necessary. Only with such partnerships can the syn-
ergies and trade-offs among SDGs and the implementation of SFM be effec-
tively addressed. However, such efforts are a work in progress, and there is a 
need to pay more attention to the promotion of finance and investments for 
sustainable land use, particularly sustainable agriculture and livestock. Here, 
impact investment may make a positive contribution. The underlying logic 
of impact investment is that there is a positive-sum game among carefully 
targeted investments that generate added value in terms of both sustainabil-
ity and profits for investors. Where there is a need from a sustainability stand-
point but no prospect of returns for investors, then the need must be met 
from national or international public finance.
Evidence has been presented which suggests that a focus solely on the SDGs 
is insufficient when contemporary global economic governance, including 
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forest-related crimes, negates the gains from the sustainability agenda. It is 
argued that efforts to strengthen the means of implementation and forge 
innovative partnerships are taking place within a global economic system 
governed by neoliberal principles rather than the principles of conservation 
or sustainability. Major constraints to sustainable development lie in deep-
rooted structures and practices that continue to generate and reinforce unsus-
tainable practices in forestry and other extractive industries, with widening 
inequalities and power disparities severely curtailing the ability of govern-
ments and other actors to pursue sustainability.
The dominant global political agenda remains focused on economic growth 
and the liberalisation of trade and investment rather than conservation and 
sustainable development. We therefore finish on a cautionary note: a focus 
on just forest-related financial flows and forest-related partnerships misses 
the bigger picture. Financing for sustainable development is negated by net 
South-to-North financial flows and vast inequalities of power that undermine 
the capacity of many countries to conserve the ecological life-support func-
tions on which present and future generations depend. Achieving genuinely 
durable and long-term sustainability requires turning our attention to the 
environmentally degrading effects of the broader structures of economic 
governance.
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